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1. Introduction. 
 
An explicit system of Deposit Insurance may be defined as the instrument through which the 
banking system guarantees that funds deposited by the public in a bank are independent of solvency 
and liquidity conditions of the bank itself, so that depositors may be sure of being reimbursed at any 
time.  Recently, much attention has been given in the economic literature to the role of legal, 
political and regulatory institutions as important determinants of the evolution in both the financial 
structure and efficiency as well as the macroeconomic performances of one country.  In the 
aftermath of the many banking and financial crises that have shaken the world in the last two 
decades, many institutional reforms of the financial system have relied on the introduction of an 
explicit scheme for deposit protection. This particular instrument aims at two main targets, 
contributing to systemic stability and protecting depositors.  However it also affects the interest rate 
spread in the banking system, which may be viewed as an indicator of market power in this 
financial segment.   
This paper provides an empirical investigation of the effect of deposit insurance and other 
institutional and economic variables on bank interest rates across countries. Hence, it adds to a 
starting but growing literature devoted to test different hypothesis regarding the effects of deposit 
insurance on the stability of the banking system, on market discipline, and on the development of 
large and efficient financial markets (see Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002, for a survey).  It is also 
related to the literature on the deep determinants of economic growth, which emphasizes the role of 
institutions as a driving force of economic development. In this paper, we focus on the role of 
institutions and institutional quality on bank interest rates, which are in turn important determinants 
of investment and consumption choices. 
We start by discussing the role of explicit deposit insurance in the financial safety net as well as the 
peculiar features of different deposit insurance schemes across countries. We review both the 
theoretical literature and the empirical evidence on the topic. We then move to investigate how 
deposit insurance is likely to affect interest rates in the banking sector. We collect data on different 
economic and financial variables, as well as institutional indicators, for a set of 80 countries.  The 
obvious starting hypothesis to test is how deposit insurance affects the lending borrowing spread in 
banking. One would expect that deposit protection should raise the spread by mainly affecting the 
deposit rate (negatively).  We do find a positive effect of deposit insurance on the spread, but when 
we move to study the reaction of its components we find that the main effect seems to arise from an 
increase in the lending rate. We interpret this result as coherent with the large theoretical literature 
that underlines the presence of relevant moral hazard problems related to this instrument.   
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We also find that higher quality of institutions lowers lending borrowing spreads, thus contributing 
to eroding sources of market power in the banking sector.  In our estimations, higher quality of 
institutions reduces both lending and deposit rates, although the impact is stronger on the former.   
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the main features of an explicit scheme 
of deposit insurance. In Section 3, we review the theoretical and empirical literature on deposit 
insurance and we discuss how this instrument can contribute to reach the targets of systemic 
stability and protection of depositors. After focusing on some recent papers that have started to 
produce empirical evidence on the effect of deposit insurance on the structure, efficiency and 
stability of the financial system, in Section 4 we present our international dataset and we state the 
hypothesis that we wish to test empirically. The results of our empirical investigation are given and 
discussed in Section 5, while in Section 6 we summarize and conclude. 
 
2. Deposit Insurance Across Countries. 
In spite of the relevant problems linked to deposit protection and discussed below, most advanced 
countries have adopted an explicit scheme of bank deposit insurance. Recent surveys conducted by 
the IMF and the World Bank show that Deposit Protection is currently and explicitly a crucial 
component in the financial safety net of 72 countries around the world (Garcia, 2000). The financial 
crises experienced in the 80s and the 90s have surely contributed to the diffusion of explicit systems 
of deposit insurance in recent times: for example, 30 of the 72 countries mentioned in the study 
cited above have introduced explicit deposit protection in the 90s (49 in the last two decades) and 
33 countries have reformed their schemes in the same period. Besides being an obvious concern for 
policy makers and regulators, the topic is also widely discussed among academics: the economic 
literature is rich of both theoretical and empirical papers devoted to deposit insurance, following the 
seminal works of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig (1983). However, in the literature, much 
less enthusiasm for this instrument can be found with respect to the one observed in practical 
implementations.  
Explicit Deposit Protection may be designed to achieve different policy targets. However, the two 
main objectives are consumer protection and macroeconomic stability. It is argued that small 
depositors have to be (preferably partially) insured against losses, as they lack the ability to monitor 
the banks where they place their money. Furthermore, they have to be provided with a mechanism 
to quickly recover the funds they are supposed to use for transactions. In addition, given the strong 
links among banks due to the working of the payment system and the management of monetary 
policy, it is necessary to avoid or at least minimize the risk that a bank failure spreads out fears of 
financial contagion in the system, inducing depositors to withdraw their funds even from safe and 
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solid banks (bank runs). Deposit Protection is hence viewed as an essential component in the 
financial safety net, together with the lending of last resort provided by the central bank, standard 
banking regulation and supervisory controls.  
Deposit Protection is not offered homogeneously to depositors across countries, as underlined by 
the investigations performed at the IMF and the World Bank.2  The currently adopted schemes 
differ widely with respect to many dimensions. Deposit Insurance is surely a function of public 
interest. But its provision can be assigned either to a public or to a private (or mixed) agency. 
Participation to the system can be mandatory or voluntary, and financial resources devoted to 
payouts can be collected via ex-ante contributions or by raising funds only when needed (ex-post). 
The Deposit Insurer can be given only the task of reimbursing depositors or can be assigned a 
broader mandate and participate to information collection, crises management and supervisory 
activities in the banking sector. Only some categories of deposits can be insured - or all types, and 
each deposit account or each depositor can be eligible for partial or full payout.  
Obviously, the nature and backing (public/private/mixed) of the scheme shapes the kind of mandate 
and powers that are given to the protection scheme. In advanced countries3, supervisory powers are 
usually not assigned to deposit insurers, the most relevant exception being the FDIC in the United 
States. In the same countries, participation to a system of deposit protection is normally 
compulsory. This avoids serious adverse selection problems linked to voluntary participation. In 
some countries (including Germany and Spain) more than just one scheme is active, but it is not 
always the case that banks are free to choose their insurer simply as a result of competition: 
actually, in most countries the market is segmented ex-ante, with certain types of institutions 
(cooperative or local banks) being obliged to use a system and other types adopting a different 
scheme.  
A protection system is sounder where the number of insured institutions is higher and where the 
banking sector is less concentrated, as the payouts for a failed bank can be spread on a considerable 
number of institutions of adequate size. In countries where a few banks have high shares of the 
market, the failure of a large player can result in excessive burden for other participating members. 
At the end of 2000, Japan was the only country where deposit protection was complete, that is no 
limit was established for reimburses to depositors. This was done as an emergency measure, and 
remained in place until April 2002.  Partial insurance was provided by all other countries, with 
Mexico, the US and Italy offering particular generous protection to depositors (respectively, 
100,000 dollars and 100,000 Euro).  
                                                 
2 See  Garcia (2000) and Demirguc-Kunt and Sobaci (2001). Table 1, in the appendix, provides a summary of the main 
characteristics of deposit protection across countries.   
3 See also the recent study of the Italian Interbank Deposit Fund (FITD, 2001). 
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A major difference among the currently active deposit protection schemes is relative to the 
contribution system. This can be based on ex-post payouts or through raising a fund which is 
established and managed before crises arise. In this case, ex-post contributions are only asked in 
order to re-establish the desired level of the fund after interventions, or in case payouts exceed the 
available funds.  Clearly, the existence of a fund makes it quicker and easier reimbursing depositors. 
It also contributes to increase confidence in the protection scheme and in the banking industry.  The 
appropriate dimension of the fund level depends on the amount and the types of insured deposits. 
Obviously, all countries where a fund has been raised face the important problem of managing it in 
such a way to balance the trade off between the objective to minimize ex-post reintegration 
following future payouts (that is, maximizing its expected return) and the objective to count on a 
safe, quick and easy to use amount of funds for immediate needs. In the practice, most countries 
seem to rely heavily on the bond market (more than on either cash or stocks), where the previously 
quoted trade off may be optimized.4  
 
3. Do we need Deposit Insurance? Theory, Evidence and Discussion 
Deposit insurance clearly introduces a different treatment of (some) bank deposits with respect to 
all other financial activities where saving can be allocated. It has the consequence of putting in a 
situation of comparative disadvantage other financial intermediaries with respect to banks, and, 
inside the banking sector, it favours deposit collection vis a vis other bank liabilities.  
Deposit protection involves a typical problem of moral hazard, providing more incentives for bank 
managers to undertake risks. Moreover, a moral hazard problem affects also depositors’ behaviour: 
by relying on the full reimbursement of their deposits’ nominal value, they have no interest in 
choosing a specific bank, nor are they interested in monitoring banks.5 This moral hazard problem 
increases when the insured quota of bank deposits is higher and is one of the main theoretical 
arguments put forward by the opponents of explicit systems of deposit insurance. 
Indeed, the first theoretical papers on deposit insurance were kind of optimistic. Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983) were the first authors to explicitly model bank runs as liquidity crises. In their model 
deposit insurance could prove useful in eliminating the sunspot equilibrium inducing a bank run. 
However, bank assets were totally riskless in their analysis and runs driven only by exogenous 
expectations, with the consequence that the role of deposit insurance is not clearly different from 
the one of lending of last resort. On the other side, Goodhart (1999) underlines that pure liquidity 
                                                 
4 See FITD 2001. 
5 Even Deposit Protection Agencies may pose moral hazard problems, especially in the case of a public system. 
Managers, in order to maintain their position, could be more interested in implementing forbearance policies than in a 
prompt solution of the crisis, as their target would simply be to avoid bank failures during their term of tenure. 
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crises do not exist in the modern world, but do only mask solvency crises. If this view is accepted, 
then the role of deposit insurance and lending of last resort may be better defined. As a matter of 
fact, it is the lending of last resort function that has to deal with the possible threats to systemic 
stability posed by the working of the payment system, the interbank market and the use of 
derivatives. Systemic stability is not so much threatened by retail deposits, to which deposit 
protection is normally limited.  
This view is shared by Di Giorgio and Di Noia (2002) who, in order to rationalize whether and how 
deposits should be given protection, start by analyzing the role of the two main targets usually 
assigned to explicit deposit insurance (i.e. protection of depositors and systemic stability). These 
authors observe that no consensus has been reached on which target is more relevant, the reason 
being also that such targets seem mutually inconsistent. On one side, the objective of depositors’ 
protection excludes interbank deposits from coverage if the target is to provide insurance mainly to 
small and naïve investors who are not able to monitor banks. On the other side, systemic stability is 
at risk mostly because of the strong interbank links in the payment system and in monetary policy 
operations.  This ambiguity may be dangerous, as it is the practical managing of deposit protection 
schemes when it tries to simultaneously protect the system from the threat of financial contagion 
after a banking crisis and, at the same time, tries to avoid subsidizing bank risk taking that 
encourage imprudent choices and banking practices. The clear objective of deposit protection 
should be what is exactly and explicitly stated in its name, providing depositors with a safe way to 
transfer resources over time while keeping their immediate liquidity.6 The objective of 
macroeconomic financial stability can be pursued with a full set of other tools, including fiscal 
policy, reserve and capital requirements, lending of last resort; the objective of microeconomic 
stability, that is avoiding bank failures, maybe, is simply wrong. 
But why deposits or depositors have to be protected? Sight deposits have been considered “special” 
as they combine certainty of nominal value with immediate liquidity (shares of money market 
mutual funds are also very liquid, but they are market priced). This justifies lower or even zero 
return in terms of interest earned. But, are these features not compatible with risk? It is quite 
difficult to sustain such a thesis. The other traditional reason to consider deposits as a “special” 
asset is linked to their important role in funding bank loans. If bank loans are a “special” source of 
finance, because of their informational content and because sometimes they are the only source of 
funding for bank dependent firms, then deposits should also be viewed as particularly relevant in 
the economy. However, bank loans can be equally (and actually are) funded via other bank 
liabilities, such as bonds or Certificates of Deposits. Moreover, bank loans are also always less 
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“special”, since they can be re-organized and more or less easily liquidated through securitization.  
If one agrees with such arguments, then the only rationale to protect private sight deposits is to 
assume that their special feature of combining immediate liquidity with nominal value certainty 
makes them a natural target also for naïve and unsophisticated investors. And such investors would 
deserve strengthened protection with respect to the general level of protection given to all kind of 
savings.  
Private holders of sight deposits should then be given protection essentially because it would be 
probably impossible, or extremely costly, to prove in court who is a sophisticated investor and who 
is not (hence becoming eligible for reimbursement).  Hence, Di Giorgio and Di Noia (2002) arrived 
to a practical motivation for deposit protection, which is linked to the right objective of protecting 
uninformed and naïve savers. But they also underline that no solid theoretical reason exists to 
justify this practical solution.7 In addition, one may also notice that this argument was surely more 
valid at times in which the financial system was less developed and financial culture and 
information much more limited. It is less applicable today, as banks are always less special as 
collectors of savings and investors always more sophisticated, as it is witnessed by the boom in 
mutual and pension funds, life insurance and direct equity trading that characterize OECD 
countries.8 
However, if this practical rationale for deposit protection is accepted, what kind of features should a 
modern insurance scheme have in advanced industrial countries?9 Here, the main objective is to 
deal with the moral hazard problems mentioned above and underlined especially by Benston and 
Kaufman (1998) and Calomiris (1999).  The following broad guidelines can be suggested. 
First, the costs of deposit protection should be at least partially borne by the industry, and the 
scheme should then be either privately managed or “mixed”. This provides the correct incentives 
for bankers to maintaining soundness and avoiding participants to pay the costs of bank failures (not 
the case when the burden is entirely put on taxpayers’ shoulders). However, a mixed scheme is to 
be preferred as a totally private one is less credible in the case of financial contagion, as it may lack 
the resources to back the obligations of a large number of banks. Some form of government 
guarantee or a special credit line open with the central bank is hence desirable.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
6 For an opposite view, see Santomero (2001), who argues that the main target should be that of macroeconomic 
stability. 
7 Kocherlakota (2000) has a model in which deposit insurance is efficient in providing insurance against realizations of 
adverse aggregate shocks to the value of collateral required in debt contracts. The result however is not fully 
generalizable. 
8 We could also go further and sustain an even more provocative argument. Often, the existing Deposit Protection 
Schemes do not even really provide “insurance” to depositors in the sense that they reimburse the funds after a bank 
crisis. And this happens because the intervention of the Protection scheme is often intended to solve the crisis in a way 
different from the simple failure and closing of a bank, thus pursuing the wrong target of microeconomic stability (at 
least, this seems to emerge from some answers to the FITD Survey mentioned above). 
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Second, blanket coverage is clearly not an efficient solution under normal circumstances, as it 
increases the moral hazard problems already linked to deposit insurance. In theory, explicit limited 
coverage is to be preferred to full insurance as it provides incentives to monitor bank behavior. The 
same task could be pursued via a mechanism of coinsurance, where each depositor is reimbursed 
only up to a certain percentage of his credit. In any case, the amount of coverage should not be too 
high if the main object of protection is the small and naive investor. Insurance should be excluded 
for selected types of deposit accounts, as inter-bank deposits, government deposits, illegal deposits 
or deposits that are given higher rates of return.  
Summing up, an ideal protection scheme should provide limited but extensive coverage. That is, 
most depositors should be protected, but the level of individual protection should not be excessive10 
in order to induce wealthier depositors (who are supposed to be more sophisticated and informed) to 
monitor banks, thereby actively participating to supervision and reinforcing market discipline.  
Third, protection should be given according to a proper mechanism of ex-ante contribution by 
banks, where the insurance premiums should explicitly be risk-weighted.11 It is essential that the 
premia be paid for each additional deposit, although the required premia may be lowered once the 
level of the fund has reached a certain dimension with respect to the amount of insured deposits. 
Such dimension might be established according to the best practice of OECD countries in the last 
two decades; this leads to a coverage ratio that should be around 1 or 2 %. In order to correctly 
measure risks, it would be desirable to adopt methods at least broadly coherent with those envisaged 
by the New Basel Framework for Capital Adequacy. Risk classes should hence be function of both 
the solvency ratio and other indicators of bank liquidity and deposits’ volatility. 12  
Fourth, it is essential to have the general public aware of the existence and the extension of deposit 
protection. This might call for a campaign of advertising jointly conducted by the banking 
supervisory agency and the banking industry. 
Finally, it is important to establish appropriate institutional relationships between a deposit 
guarantee scheme and other banking supervisory agencies and political bodies. The deposit 
protection agency should have absolute political independence. Economic independence will be 
                                                                                                                                                                  
9 We do not investigate here the different features that should be adequate for low developed or emerging countries. 
10 The recent FDIC proposal to raise individual protection up to 200,000 dollars in the USA goes, in our view, in the 
wrong direction. 
11 It is interesting to note that in a very recent contribution, Boyd, Chang and Smith (2002) develop a general 
equilibrium analysis of deposit insurance programs and obtain results that are not fully consistent with some of the 
above suggested guidelines. For example, in  their paper, actuarially fair pricing of deposit insurance is not always 
desirable, while some bank subsidization is. Also, not necessarily large losses of the deposit insurance agency are bad in 
terms of welfare, neither risk-based deposit insurance premia are always good to reduce moral hazard.   
12 Subordinated debt may be an additional effective method to ensure a certain degree of market discipline. The 
evaluation of risks by subordinated debt owners may be reflected in the structure of subordinated interest rates. The 
guarantee scheme might consider such rates as a useful indicator for pricing insurance premia, as well as an indicator of 
the bank’s solvency. 
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provided by ex-ante contributions. It should have limited supervisory powers, and should participate 
to the decisional process about intervention, working in close collaboration with the banking 
supervisory agency. It would be interesting to evaluate whether merging the banking supervisory 
agency with the deposit protection agency would be desirable. The deposit protection agency should 
be accountable to the banking supervisory agency, to the industry and to the agencies responsible 
for customer protection. The board of the agency should include “independent” administrators, with 
the explicit task of safeguarding the interest of private depositors.    
The presence and the features of an explicit system of deposit insurance does also affect the banking 
system with respect to its competitive structure and to bank profitability.  
It helps smaller banks in attracting depositors and hence limit pressures towards higher and 
excessive concentration. In absence of deposit protection, depositors would be more willing to deal 
with big banks, as these are expected to be too big to fail and to receive implicit insurance from 
either the central bank or the government.  
Besides, it may affect both lending and deposit interest rates, and the bank interest rate spread 
which may be viewed as either an indicator of market power or of profitability in this financial 
segment.  Deposit rates can be affected because deposit protection raises demand for deposits and 
contributes to lower their equilibrium required rate of return. Lending rates may be affected directly 
through a change in the incentives for lending policies associated to higher moral hazard problems 
linked to the existence of deposit insurance, and indirectly through the effect on the competitive 
structure of the banking system. 
This paper provides an empirical investigation of the effect of deposit insurance on bank interest 
rates.  Hence, it aims to contribute to a starting but growing empirical literature on the effect of 
deposit insurance on banking and financial systems. Such empirical literature stems from the 
projects undertaken at the IMF and the World Bank and directed at constructing international 
databases that could prove useful for this scope. A survey of the first results obtained is presented in 
Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002).   
Maybe, the most important empirical work in the field is the one by Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002), who show that moral hazard matters.    Indeed, these authors use data from 61 
countries in the 1980-997 period and find that the presence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme 
increases the likelihood that a country will experience a banking crisis.  They estimate a model in 
which the dependent variable is the probability of a country experiencing a banking crisis and 
include in the regressors a set of controlling variables and a dummy variable relative to the presence 
of deposit insurance. The coefficient of this variable is generally positive (although not always 
significant at the standard 95% confidence level). Moreover, when they introduce among the 
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regressors some proxies for the quality of institutions, they find that the positive contribution of 
deposit insurance to bank fragility is strong and determinant only in countries where the 
institutional setting is very poor.  The result does not hold in countries with stronger institutional 
and regulatory environments.   
A negative effect of explicit deposit protection on the development and efficiency of the financial 
system (also when coupled with poor institutions) is found in the work of Cull, Senbet and Sorge 
(2002) and in Laeven (2002) and Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2001).  In particular, the first paper 
finds that the establishment of a scheme for deposit protection retards the development of financial 
markets and of financial depth in general, while the other two papers show that it reduces market 
discipline in the sense of lowering banks’ interest rate expense and making it less sensitive to bank 
risk and liquidity.   
In the next section, we will address the question of how deposit insurance affects international bank 
lending borrowing spreads and interest rates. 
 
4.  Deposit insurance, institutions and bank interest rates:  data and hypothesis to test 
4.1 Data 
We collect data on economic and financial variables, as well as institutional indicators, for a set of 
80 countries listed in the data appendix (all OECD countries plus other selected Central and Eastern 
European, Latin American, Mid-East, African and Asian countries). Control variables that were 
originally a time series have been transformed into a single observation by computing the arithmetic 
mean over a period of five years (1996-2001). The sample has been chosen in order to get 
consistency with deposit insurance data availability, and its length selected because most business 
cycle effects are likely to become negligible across five years. The sample size varies (from 47 to 
80 observations) according to the control variables included in the regression, and it was further 
adjusted when needed to match non-missing data and to exclude outliers. 
Data were drawn from a few different sources: deposit and lending rates, a government bond yield, 
the inflation rate, nominal and real GDP growth are taken from the IMF International Financial 
Statistics. The real GDP growth has been computed from the GDP volume index (based  =100 in 
1995), while the inflation rate from the consumer price index. GDP per capita has been drawn from 
National Statistics. 
The institutional quality indicators are the Rule of Law index and the Hall & Jones index. The 
former is taken from Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton (2002), and summarises “in broad terms 
the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions which govern their interactions”. It includes 
“several indicators which measure the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
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rules of society. These include perceptions of the incidence of both violent and non-violent crime, 
the effectiveness and predictability of the judiciary, and the enforceability of contracts. Together, 
these indicators measure the success of a society in developing an environment in which fair and 
predictable rules form the basis for economic and social interactions.”.  The Rule of Law index is 
measured on a [-2.5, +2.5] scale. 
The Hall & Jones (1999) index is a measure of social infrastructure across countries proxying for 
“the wedge between the private return to productive activities and the social return to such 
activities”. It combines an index of government anti-diversion policies13 with an index of the 
openness of a country to trade with other countries14, which are equally weighted so that the index 
is measured on a [0,1] scale. 
The deposit insurance dummy assigns the value of one to countries where there is an explicit 
deposit insurance protection system and the value of zero to countries where there isn’t. It is taken 
from Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001), together with the information about a deposit insurance limit 
per account or per person: this limit has been evaluated in US dollars and considered both as a 
continuous variable and as a dummy variable (the latter being 1 if the limit is larger or equal to 20 
thousands US dollars and 0 otherwise).  As regards the features of the deposit insurance protection 
system we considered also data on the existence of coinsurance: a variable named coinsurance has 
thus been created, taking on the value one “if depositors face a deductible in their insured funds”15 
and zero otherwise. From the same source we drew data on the funding of the deposit insurance 
scheme: the variable funding takes on the value of one if the scheme is funded ex ante and zero 
otherwise.16 
Moving to financial structural variables, data about the concentration of the banking sector were 
taken from Beck, Demirguç-Kunt and Levine (1999): the variable concentration is the ratio of the 
three largest banks’ assets to the total banking sector assets. A highly concentrated commercial 
banking sector might result in lack of competitive pressure to attract savings and channel them 
efficiently to investors.  
Data relating to a bank-based versus-a market based financial system are taken from Levine (2002): 
the variable structure activity measures the activity of the stock market relative to that of banks, 
                                                 
13 It is focused on the government’s role in protecting against private diversion and the government possible role as a 
diverter. So it includes a measure of law and order, of bureaucratic quality, of corruption, risk of expropriation and 
government repudiation of contracts. 
14 It is the Sachs and Warner  index that measures “the fraction of years during the period 1950 to 1994 that the 
economy has been open”, according to the satisfaction of specific criteria: nontariff barriers cover less than 40% of 
trade, average tariff rates are less than 40%, any black market premium was less than 20% during the 1970s and 1980s, 
the country is not classified as socialist, and the government does not monopolize major exports. 
15 The source is Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002. 
16 As in Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002. 
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where the former is the total value traded ratio17 and the latter the bank credit ratio18. Structure 
activity equals the logarithm of the total value traded ratio divided by the bank credit ratio. The 
variable structure aggregate is a “conglomerate  measure of financial structure based on activity, 
size, and efficiency. Specifically structure-aggregate is the first principal component of structure-
activity, structure-size19 and structure-efficiency20. Thus structure-aggregate is the variable that best 
explains (highest joint R-square) the first three financial structure indicators” (Levine, 2002).   
Summary statistics of our dataset are provided in the data appendix. 
 
4.2 Hypothesis to test 
We want to investigate how deposit insurance affects the lending borrowing spread in banking. One 
would expect that deposit protection should raise the spread by affecting the deposit rate 
(negatively). The presence of explicit protection makes deposits safer and may thus lower deposit 
rates. However, if the moral hazard view is right, deposit protection may also affect the lending rate 
(positively). In fact, explicit deposit insurance could induce bank managers to lend to riskier firms, 
thus requiring on average higher interest rates for the loans provided.  So, the hypothesis to test are: 
 
H1)  Explicit deposit insurance raises the lending borrowing spread. 
H2)  The effect stems from a reduction in the deposit rate. 
H3)  The effect is driven from an increase in the lending rate.  
 
In order to investigate whether some features of the deposit protection scheme have the desired 
effect of lowering the moral hazard problems implicit with deposit protection, we also test whether 
in countries with an explicit deposit insurance scheme, providing coinsurance or limited coverage to 
depositors has an effect on bank lending and deposit rates. The hypothesis to test here would be the 
following: 
 
                                                 
17 Which equals the value of domestic equities traded on domestic exchanges divided by GDP. This ratio is frequently 
used to gauge market liquidity because it measures market trading relative to economic activity. See Levine, 2000. 
18 Which equals the value of deposit money bank credits to the private sector as a share of GDP. See Levine, 2000. 
19 Structure-Size is a measure of the size of the stock market relative to that of banks. The size of the domestic stock 
market is the market capitalization ratio, which equals the value of domestic equities listed on domestic exchanges 
divided by GDP. The size of banks is the bank credit ratio. Thus structure-size equals the logarithm of the market 
capitalization ratio divided by the bank credit ratio. See Levine, 2000. 
20 Structure-Efficiency is a measure of the efficiency of the stock market relative to that of banks. The efficiency of the 
stock market is proxied by the total value traded ratio since it reflects the liquidity of the domestic stock market, while 
the efficiency of the banking sector is proxied by overhead costs, which equals the overhead costs of the banking 
system relative to banking system assets. Structure-Efficiency is the logarithm of the total value traded ratio times 
overhead costs. See Levine, 2000. 
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H4) The introduction of limited coverage or coinsurance increases deposit rates because reduces 
protection. 
H5)  The introduction of limited coverage or coinsurance reduces lending rates because stimulates 
depositors to more effectively monitor bank lending policies so as to reduce excessive risk taking. 
 
If H4) and H5) were both accepted, we should then obtain a reduction in the bank spread of those 
countries where the explicit deposit insurance scheme exhibits such features. 
 
5. Estimation and Results 
We estimate the effect of deposit insurance, institutional quality and other economic and financial 
variables on bank interest rates through simple OLS regressions. Our benchmark equation is: 
 
Dep. Variable = Constant + alpha1(Controls) + alpha 2 (Deposit Insurance) + alpha 3 (Institutional 
quality) + error term 
 
where the dependent variable is either the banking spread or one of its component (deposit or 
lending rate). The macroeconomic controls we use are: inflation, GDP per capita and real gdp 
growth. The bank-specific structural variables are: concentration of the banking sector and an 
indicator of the financial structure. We also include an index of institutional quality. Other 
explanatory variables taken into account are the existence of limited coverage or of coinsurance and 
the type of funding system (ex ante – ex post) in the deposit insurance scheme, and an index of 
creditor rights. 
 
We expect the lending borrowing spread to increase if an explicit deposit insurance scheme is 
adopted, when controlling for structural variables. An explicit deposit insurance scheme should in 
fact reduce deposit rates because it makes deposits safer. We do actually find a positive effect of 
deposit insurance on the spread, but when we move to study the reaction of its components we find 
that the main effect seems to arise from an increase in the lending rate. We interpret this result as 
coherent with the large theoretical literature that underlines the presence of relevant moral hazard 
problems related to this instrument.  We also find that higher quality of institutions lowers lending 
borrowing spreads, thus contributing to eroding sources of market power in the banking sector.  In 
our estimations, higher quality of institutions reduces both lending and deposit rates, although the 
impact is stronger on the former. 
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In Table 1 we report results of different estimated versions of our benchmark regression, where we 
added or changed explanatory variables one at a time in order to control for the marginal impact of 
each additional variable with respect to the baseline model (equation 1). 
The first column shows that even a few basic variables manage to explain more than 60% of the 
variability in the spread: all the estimated coefficients but the constant term are strongly significant. 
The marginal effect of deposit insurance is positive, as expected, and significant at 98.5% 
confidence level. The point estimate indicates that the introduction of an explicit deposit insurance 
scheme raises the spread by almost 2 percentage points.   
As regards the structural variables, an increase in the concentration of the banking sector, increasing 
market power of the largest banks, significantly raises the spread. The effect of inflation is positive 
and strongly significant, thus implying that an increase in the inflation rate is unequally transferred 
to the two categories of agents a bank has to deal with: the spread increases as inflation gets higher, 
thus suggesting that banks charge their lenders higher prices because of the loss of purchasing 
power, but do not symmetrically compensate their depositors for such loss.  
Table 1 
  eq_01 eq_02 eq_03 eq_04 eq_05 eq_06 eq_07 
 Dep.Var:  spread spread Spread Spread Spread spread spread 
Indep. Var.s:       
C         0.017        0.063             0.012         0.019       0.037       0.049        0.032
         (0.011)        (0.018)             (0.011)        (0.011)       (0.012)       (0.012)       (0.012)
INFL          0.153        0.197             0.157        0.138       0.047       0.043        0.070
         (0.039)        (0.039)             (0.056)        (0.039)       (0.059)       (0.038)       (0.056)
CONC          0.051         0.048             0.054        0.060        0.041        0.043        0.046
         (0.016)        (0.018)             (0.016)        (0.017)       (0.018)       (0.018)       (0.015)
RLAW  -0.022  -0.030         -0.024 -0.030 -0.032 -0.020
         (0.004)              (0.008)        (0.004)       (0.005)       (0.006)       (0.007)
DEPINS  0.019 0.021 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.017         0.016
         (0.007)        (0.008)             (0.009)        (0.007)       (0.008)       (0.008)       (0.009)
HJ   -0.083     
          (0.022)      
GDPCAP    7.30E-07    
                (0.000)    
SAGGR      0.005   
            (0.004)  
SA       0.005  
             (0.003) 
CRED        -0.003
              (0.003)
GROWTH             -0.057    
            (0.039)    
         
Adjusted R squared 0,603 0,539 0,611 0,623 0,61 0,617 0,499
n.observations 54 54 54 53 41 41 39
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
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The institutional quality indicator is also strongly significant and shows that an increase in the Rule 
of Law index, which is orientated so that higher values correspond to better outcomes, shrinks the 
spread. An institutional and legal environment that ease authority exercise, supports productive 
activities and protects output of productive units from diversion seems to encourage banks 
efficiency and to contribute to eroding market power in lending. The intuition behind this follows 
from the fact that a more favorable and stable financial and legal environment provides the right 
incentives to accumulation of capital, skill acquisition, invention and technology transfer, while 
allowing agents to save considerable resources dedicated to these activities.  
These basic results are confirmed by the second regression, in which we use the Hall and Jones 
index of institutional quality in place of the Rule of Law and in all the other five exercises where we 
have allowed for an extension of our benchmark regression. Equations 3 and 4 show that the 
introduction of additional macroeconomic controls, as GDP per capita or real growth, does not play 
much a role in explaining market power in the banking sector.21 Equation 5 and 6 show that the 
introduction of a variable that measures the financial structure of a country (SA or SAGGR), that is 
whether a country’s financial system is more or less market oriented, has very limited explanatory 
power. Moreover, it eliminates the contribution of inflation to the regression, most likely because 
this variable is highly correlated with the new ones (given that they include the total value of assets 
traded on the stock market).  Finally, equation 7 provides a negative but statistically not significant 
coefficient for a variable measuring creditors’ rights. In all these specifications, however the effect 
of deposit insurance and of institutional quality remains basically unchanged. 
 
We then move to analyze where the effect on the banking rate spread is originated by estimating 
equations where the deposit and the lending rates are the dependent variables. 
Table 2 reports estimates of the deposit and lending rate regressions: observing the two at the same 
time sheds additional light on the sources of the dynamics of the bank spread described above.  
An explanatory variable that is strongly significant in both specifications is the institutional quality 
index. The Rule of Law indicator enters the deposit equation with a negative coefficient, and a point 
estimate of considerable magnitude: an improvement in the social infrastructure index of one unit 
reduces deposit rates by more than 3 percentage points. However such social infrastructure indicator 
                                                 
21Such result is not surprising if we consider the recent growth literature that sees institutional quality as responsible for 
both the levels and dynamics of GDP. Hall and Jones (1999) find out that social infrastructure is a key determinant of 
output per worker and economic growth, since it drives successful investments in physical and human capital and the 
high levels of productivity in using these inputs. Therefore the irrelevance of economic development as an explanatory 
variable may not be substantial: macroeconomic structure and performance may already be accounted for by the 
institutional quality index, which has been found to be strongly responsible for that.  
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ranges from –2.5 to +2.5, so that a one unit increase reflects a radical change in the institutional and 
legal environment, that can probably be achieved only on a mid and long-term perspective. The 
lending equation, in second column, shows that the same one unit increase in the rule of law index 
reduces the lending rate by more than 5 percentage points, which is consistent with the overall 
reduction in the spread by approximately 2 percentage points. 
 
Table 2  
  eq_dep01 eq_lend01 eq_dep02 eq_lend02 Eq_dep03 eq_lend03 eq_dep_04 eq_lend04
          
Indep.Vars:        
C  0.090 0.107         0.166 0.229 0.069 0.130 0.068 0.114
           [0.016]          [0.017]       [0.022]          [0.027] [0.017]          [0.023]          [0.016]       [0.020]
INFL  0.383 0.481         0.425 0.582 0.481 0.402 0.474 0.398
           [0.097]          [0.056]       [0.048]          [0.060] [0.157]          [0.094]          [0.071]       [0.093]
CONC  -0.000 0.042       -0.001 0.037 0.029 0.058 0.030 0.056
           [0.020]          [0.024]      [0.022]          [0.027] [0.025]          [0.029]          [0.024]       [0.029]
RLAW  -0.031 -0.056   -0.032 -0.069 -0.033 -0.069
           [0.006]          [0.006]  [0.007]          [0.008]          [0.006]       [0.008]
DEPINS  -0.010 0.020        -0.005 0.023 -0.010 0.017 -0.009 0.019
           [0.011]          [0.011]       [0.010]          [0.013] [0.011]          [0.012]          [0.010]       [0.012]
HJ           -0.137 -0.219     
          [0.028]          [0.034]    
SAGGR        0.003 0.009
                 [0.005]       [0.006]
SA      0.000 0.007   
               [0.003]          [0.005]   
          
Adjusted R 
squared 0,75 0,844 0,74 0,79 0,806 0,838 0,808 0,84
n.observations 55 53 55 54 42 41 42 41
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 
Concentration in the banking sector shows a negative and insignificant coefficient in the deposit 
equation, while positively affects the lending rate22.  
The variable we are more concerned with is the deposit insurance dummy. We find that the main 
and obvious argument to explain the positive effect on the bank spread does not seem to be 
confirmed. The effect of the introduction of an explicit deposit insurance scheme is negative on the 
deposit rate, as we expected, but it is never statistically significant. Therefore, the effect of the 
introduction of a deposit insurance scheme on market power in the banking sector is not passing 
through deposit rates, despite deposits are made safer and thus require a smaller risk premium.  
                                                 
22 At a 91% confidence level. The effect of Concentration on the lending rate is usually, but not always, statistically 
significant. We have maintained this variable only for coherence with the previous specification.  As a matter of fact, 
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When we estimate an equation with the lending rate as the dependent variable, we find that the 
introduction of an explicit deposit insurance scheme plays a role: at approximately 90% confidence 
level, the introduction of deposit insurance raises lending rates by roughly 1.8%, which basically 
accounts for the whole change that explicit deposit protection induces on the spread. We interpret 
this finding as evidence of moral hazard problems induced by deposit insurance on banks’ behavior, 
an issue often raised by economists in policy debates about the pros and cons of deposit insurance. 
Banks may actually be encouraged to finance high-risk projects (and thus pricing higher lending 
rates) when a deposit insurance scheme is introduced. This evidence is coherent with the results of 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), that showed how deposit insurance may lead to more bank 
failures; if banks take on risks that are correlated, systemic banking crises may also become more 
frequent23.  
In light of this evidence, it is crucial to stress the role of institutions in order to reduce the possible 
adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank stability. In the lending rate regression, the rule of law 
coefficient is strongly significant and negative. As already noticed, an improvement in the quality of 
institutions and legal environment reduces the lending rate by more than 5 percentage points, thus 
showing that moral hazard can be controlled by a good social infrastructure. Where institutions are 
of high quality, so bank prudential regulation and supervision should be, thereby reducing gambling 
opportunities.24  
Finally, we have investigated whether some particular features of the deposit insurance scheme do 
also affect bank rates in countries where an explicit system of deposit protection is in place. 
In Table 3, we report our results.  While the introduction of a dummy denoting the presence of 
limited coverage seems to have no effect on both the spread and its components25, we do find a 
(similar in magnitude) and positive (although barely significant) effect of coinsurance on the 
deposit and the lending rate (so that the spread is not affected).  Our empirical evidence hence 
suggests that depositors do require higher rates when deposit protection is partial, but that they do 
not engage (or are effective) in monitoring bank risky lending. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
there is no clear motivation why concentration should have a significant effect on either deposit or lending rates when 
these variables are considered separately. 
23 See Demirguç-Kunt, Detragiache, 2002. 
24 The message of the other equations in Table 2, where we have included SA and SAGGR as additional explanatory 
variables is similar, although the coefficient DEPINS becomes less significant. 
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Table 3 
 Dep Variables: Spread  Dep.rate Lend.rate Spread Dep.rate Lend.rate
Indep. Vars:        
         
C   0.036 0.094 0.130 0.058 0.059 0.117 
INFL   0.133 0.327 0.461 -0.003 0.368 0.364 
RLAW   -0.029 -0.031 -0.060 -0.038 -0.035 -0.07 
CONC   0.060 -0.013 0.046 0.052 0.015 0.067 
DEPINSAMDUM  0.001 -0.005 -0.004    
COINSURANCE     0.002 0.017* 0.019* 
         
         
Adjusted R squared  0.725 0.794 0.879 0.81 0.851 0.917
N.observations  42 42 42 31 31 31
         
In Italics coefficients that are not statistically significant     
* means that the coefficient is significant only at 85% (t=1,5)     
 
 
Robustness 
The evidence in favor of a relevant influence of the deposit insurance on market power in the 
banking sector has passed different robustness checks. Each regression showed good diagnostic 
tests, that are available upon request. Residuals‘ distribution had the standard good features, so that 
maximum likelihood inference could be done.  
Deposit insurance widens the bank interest spread in all our estimated equations. We also find 
strong and robust effects of concentration, inflation and institutional quality indexes, by adding to 
the benchmark regression a few other explanatory variables and checking that both the main 
qualitative and quantitative results of the baseline model continue to hold26 (see Table 1). 
Similar checks have been done with respect to deposit and lending rate regressions reported in 
Table 2. Here, results on deposit insurance are somehow more ambiguous. The positive effect on 
lending is obtained only at 90% confidence levels and does not hold when indicators of the financial 
structure are added to the specification. Results are more robust with respect to different indicators 
of institutional quality. However, although the qualitative information and the confidence level are 
basically unchanged, replacing Rule of Law with Hall & Jones, overall produces higher point 
estimates of the effect of institutional quality on interest rates‘ dynamics. This may be due to the 
different ranges of the two indexes. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
25 The same is true also if we use a continuous variable specifying the amount of limited coverage provided in different 
counties.  We also did not find any effect of the type of funding on which the deposit insurance scheme is based on 
bank rates. 
26 See both Table 1 and 2 where different specification are shown, starting from the benchmark to the most unrestricted. 
Even by adding other explanatory variables, the key insights do not change. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper is a contribution to the literature on the empirical effects of deposit insurance. After 
discussing pros and cons of the introduction of explicit deposit protection and the nice features that 
a desirable scheme should have, we provide an empirical investigation on the effect of deposit 
insurance and other institutional and economic variables on bank interest rates across countries.  We 
find that the existence of an explicit deposit protection scheme is likely to increase the lending 
borrowing spread in the banking sector across countries. However, the effect seems to arise not 
from the deposit side, as one would expect given that deposit protection make deposits safer and 
hence allows banks to lower their remuneration, but mostly from an increase in the average lending 
rate. We interpret this evidence as suggesting the relevance of moral hazard problems induced by 
this instrument: deposit protection provides incentives to banks to engage in riskier lending 
activities to which on average higher loan rates are priced. 
The only characteristics of the deposit insurance scheme that we find to have a (barely) significant 
effect on bank interest rates is the presence of a coinsurance provision. This is found to raise deposit 
rates and lending rates. While the latter effect is expected, the second seems to indicate that this 
provision is not effective in reducing moral hazard problems linked to bank lending activities. 
Finally, we find that indicators of institutional quality have considerable explanatory power in all 
our regressions. Countries with good quality institutions tend to exhibit lower lending borrowing 
spread, with the reduction in the lending rate dominating the reduction in the remuneration of 
deposits.    
 
Data Appendix 
Country List: 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Cyprus, Denmark, 
Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, 
Peru, Philippines, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, U.K., U.S.A., Zimbabwe, Armenia, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Bolivia, Bulgaria, China, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Guatemala, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Nepal, Nigeria, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
Zambia. 
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Data Summary Statistics: 
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